Analysing political change in Italy

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ABSTRACT After more than forty years of inertia, Italy has produced intense dynamism and political change. The literature has been bifurcated in the emphasis on domestic and European factors explaining such an extraordinary transformation. This special issue collects works that use approaches and methods of comparative politics and policy analysis to disentangle the relative importance of European and domestic factors shaping electoral competition, legislative voting behaviour, administrative reform of local authorities, lobbying, the nature of Italian capitalism, and reform of regional, pension and monetary policies. Although any generalization on the Europeanization of the Italian political system is unwarranted, a meso-level non-teleological approach has good leverage in the analysis of political change in Italy.

KEY WORDS European integration; Europeanization; Italy; policy change.

TRANSITION OR EUROPEANIZATION?

At the end of the 1980s, the Italian political system provided a classic example of inertia. The 1948 Constitution was not fit for the job of steering a country through the waters of international economic instability, European integration, and governmental inefficiency. But efforts to ‘modernize’ the Constitution failed. Electoral change was minimal, so much so that political parties could boast success every time their share of the vote increased by 2 per cent. All governments since 1948 revolved around the pivotal role of the Christian Democrats (DCs). There was no alternation in government, except for DC satellite parties and allies. The second largest political party in Italy, the Italian Communist Party, was constantly excluded from government. Yet it was systematically included in the large parliamentary majorities that approved legislation, thus providing an example of odd consociational democracy (odd in that one key partner of parliamentary majorities was formally in opposition).

State–society relations were characterized by a political culture alien to the values of the market and free enterprise. In the mid-1980s, a large international survey, the International Social Survey Programme, found a comparatively
high percentage of Italians asking for generalized price control, state ownership of major industries, and protection of employment levels irrespective of market dynamics (Weber et al. 1989). The structure of interest groups was too fragmented to produce the kind of incomes policies that enabled neighbouring countries like Austria to overcome the joint disease of inflation and unemployment. The Italian corporatist solutions of the 1980s had an ephemeral success (Lange and Regini 1989; Pappalardo 1985). The overall policy-making capabilities of the Italian state were poor, both in terms of efficiency and fairness.

Of course, inertia concealed important slow movements, such as the declining share of total votes of the two major parties, the growing importance of fiscal stabilization in the agenda of economic reforms, the independence of the Bank of Italy, and attempts to overcome the fragmentation of industrial relations with new solutions. Let us mention three landmark years in the 1980s. In 1981, the Bank of Italy was given substantial independence from the Treasury in the conduct of monetary policy (the so-called divorce between Treasury and Central Bank). In 1985 the Italian Communist Party lost a national referendum on wage indexation, thus losing its veto power on socio-economic policies and industrial relations. In 1988 the Parliament limited secret voting, a tool that enabled all sorts of non-transparent agreements between government and opposition. In the same year, the government took a step towards the control of the budgetary policy process. Law no. 362-1988 introduced the finance and planning document (DPEF) – which provided a framework for multi-annual planning. It also imposed limitations on the role of Parliament. Additionally, law no. 400-1988 on the reorganization of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers created the basis for a better organization of prime ministerial activity. However, in terms of outcomes, the picture was still one of inertia and slow, often imperceptible changes.

By contrast, since the biennium 1991 (the year of the referendum that struck down multiple preference voting) to 1992 (the start of the campaign against political corruption; and emergency measures introduced by the executive led by Giuliano Amato) Italy has been an example of intense dynamism and change (see Bufacchi and Burgess 2001 for a political chronology). European integration, specifically the Treaty provisions on economic and monetary union (EMU), has played a large role in political change, exactly in the same time period. Even the start dates of macro-political change (1991–92) coincide with the start of the EMU process. Finally, global financial pressures, such as the currency crisis of 1992, have also added force to change dynamics.

Although there is no claim in this article about the final outcome of change (that is, whether the second Italian republic is more coherent than the first, or whether the Italian transition has been completed or not) empirical evidence shows that the explanatory problem of the Italian political system has been transformed, from inertia to change. Italy has experienced the end of exclusion of the left from the executive, alternation in governments, new coalitions that
clearly indicate their designated prime minister to the electors prior to elections, processes of liberalization, fiscal discipline, and new alignments between political parties and social classes (as epitomized by the electorate of the Northern League and Forza Italia). True, the Italian Constitution has not been comprehensively transformed, but it has been strengthened in that there is a vast range of political parties fully loyal to democratic values (see Ceccanti 2004 for a thorough analysis). In the past, the Communists expressed limited loyalty to the Constitution, and the current Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Fini, was in a party that ultimately opposed the values of the Constitution.

At the cost of over-simplifying a complex literature, the two common features of recent research on Italian politics are an emphasis on change and a long-term perspective (most studies assess change over a decade, and rightly so). Typically, the literature starts from the illustration of the three major crises faced by Italy at the beginning of the 1990s (a party-systemic crisis, a crisis of legitimacy and rule of law, and a policy crisis) and assesses change by looking at either politics or policy, and occasionally at the interplay between policy and politics (Giuliani 2001).

However, perhaps as a result of the division of academic labour, the literature is bifurcated. Comparative political scientists focus on domestic political change, and give European-level variables the status of exogenous variables. The empirical substance varies from electoral studies and party-systemic analysis (D’Alimonte and Bartolini 2002) to the wider issues in terms of quality of democracy (Morlino 2003). European integration scholars, instead, explain how Europe (or, most pertinently, EMU) has changed the Italian state (Dyson and Featherstone 1996, 1999).

Even the terminology used by different authors exposes the bifurcation. Comparative political scientists group around the notion of ‘transition’ and discuss origins, process, and outcome. Those coming from European studies have opted for ‘Europeanization’, and use the Italian case as a test for their models. Occasionally, the two perspectives meet (Di Palma et al. 2000; Della Sala and Fabbrini 2004) but, more often than not, either ‘Europe’ merely crops up in narratives of the Italian transition, or domestic politics ‘shapes’ the impact of EMU or other European Union (EU)-level variables. Let us look at two examples. In a recent edited volume, Ceccanti and Vassallo (2004) explain the origins of the Italian transition on the basis of structural factors and four contingent factors. They are the fall of the Berlin Wall, the disalignment between the electors of the North and the traditional parties, the investigations on political corruption, and the fiscal–macroeconomic crisis. Then they introduce two exogenous factors, that is, the pressure for change coming from the movement promoting electoral referenda, and European integration (mostly in terms of stabilizing and disciplinary effects on policies, even at times of turbulent politics). Clearly, European integration gets into the picture as exogenous variable. It explains why some commitments to budgetary virtuosity have not been derailed by turbulent politics, but does not cause the major elements of the Italian transition.
The second example is the dense narrative of the road to EMU provided by Dyson and Featherstone (1999). In their analysis of the Italian case, they observe that EMU has changed the power relations in government (technocrats being empowered) and between core government and parliament. They first describe the change in terms of Europeanization, but then they also perceptively observe how domestic policy change was already under way and was overtaken by European constraints and pressures.

In both examples, the awareness of the interplay between European and domestic politics is there, but the puzzle is how to handle this interplay in terms of approaches and methods. Europeanization as ‘approach’ runs the risk of prejudging the impact of the EU on domestic politics, and proceeds from the top to the bottom in a rigid way. By contrast, domestic politics approaches can only accommodate Europeanization as exogenous, intervening variable. The result is that it is very difficult to measure the power of Europeanization if we cannot set it directly against the power of domestic politics variables. Put differently, we have a fairly good idea of the variation of the dependent variable (political and policy-level change), but we have trouble in explaining the variation in terms of two possible independent variables, that is, roughly speaking, Europeanization and domestic politics.

EUROPEANIZATION ‘ITALIAN STYLE’

Given the readership of this journal, the articles included in this special issue seek to avoid the limitations of Europeanization and to bring comparative politics models back into the analysis of European integration. Before we illustrate the co-ordinates of the project, it is useful to provide a stylized picture of what we know about the Europeanization of the Italian political system. This is common background in all the articles presented in the special issue. Hence we present it here.

Basically, Europeanization ‘Italian style’ is ‘Europe as a solution rather than a problem’.3 ‘The literature on European integration and international political economy looks at deep economic integration as a constraint on the policy-making capabilities of the state. The discussion is all about whether governments can get around the constraint and still produce their preferred set of policies. Some authors think that there is still substantial (although not unconstrained) latitude for domestic policy choices, both in terms of economic policies and welfare policies (Mosley 2003; Swank 2002), whilst others argue that the loss of policy-making capabilities at the domestic level is aggravated by the lack of European-level capabilities to produce welfare policies and ‘social Europe’ (Scharpf 2001, 2002). However, the literature is essentially unanimous in looking at Europeanization (and more generally deep economic integration) as a serious constraint.

By contrast, the Italian case shows how Europeanization has strengthened institutions and policies, and has increased domestic policy-making capabilities both in terms of efficiency and fairness. The point has been made by Ferrera
Della Sala (1997) shows how EMU has enabled the government to withstand interest group pressure and hence become more assertive in macroeconomic policy and microeconomic regulatory reforms. Di Palma et al. (2000) provide a balanced picture of the impact of European integration on the Italian state, but the change of political culture – notably the culture of macroeconomic stability as a prerequisite for fair and efficient policy choices – is, in their opinion, a major legacy of the path to EMU. Dyson and Featherstone (1999) are more interested in the empowerment of technocrats than in the overall effects on the Italian state. Yet they do not fail to observe an overall positive effect of EMU on the core government and the success of a pro-reform advocacy coalition. They argue that the latter used Europeanization in the 1990s as an ‘external lever’ to secure results that the domestic political system would have been structurally unable to produce. Their well-known argument about EMU as vincolo esterno (Dyson and Featherstone 1996) is not about Europe as ‘threat’ or ‘problem’, but Europe as a resource. Hence we would prefer to translate vincolo with ‘lever’ rather than ‘constraint’. Radaelli (2002) makes a distinction between phases in which Europe has been at best an intervening variable, reinforcing (but not causing) some directions and other phases of the Italian transition wherein EMU has produced causal effects (i.e. policy change).

All authors stop well before making sweeping arguments about the stability of the results achieved by Italy and the overall outcome in terms of transformation of the political system (see the warnings made by Ferrera 2003 and the even more pessimistic argument made by Salvati 2000 that Italy missed a number of chances). But none of them would object to a characterization of Europeanization as a ‘solution’ rather than a ‘problem’. Contrast this with the literature on the Europeanization of the German political system, where the notion of ‘constraint’ seems to prevail (Dyson and Goetz 2003), although Germany is a prime force in processes of European integration and therefore should have less to worry about the results of these processes.

Clearly, the European ‘solution’ was not easy to metabolize by institutions that were going through a major crisis in the 1990s. Indeed, Europeanization was also a process of learning, political struggles between different advocacy coalitions (Radaelli 1998), and uncertain results.

The point about the stability of the results is strikingly convergent with the current discussion in comparative politics about the outcome of the Italian transition. Whilst those interested in Europeanization talk about the persistence or fragility of EMU-induced institutional change, those working on the transition talk about the completion of the process (‘to close the transition chapter’, or chiudere la transizione is Ceccanti and Vassallo’s (2004) slogan). In his analysis of the Europeanization of the Italian political system, Ferrera makes
the link between the two discussions explicit when he adds to his remarks on 
Europeanization that ‘the transition is not finished yet. The innovative changes 
which emerged over the last decade have not yet reached a stable institutional, 
political, and economic equilibrium’ (Ferrera 2003: 247 our translation).

SPECIFIC RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This is where we do not follow the current discussion. A research agenda 
focused on the ‘final equilibrium point’ is normatively loaded. Implicit is a 
benchmark of equilibrium that can be questioned. If the ‘Europeanization 
benchmark’ is Germany or France, one could say that the EMU-induced 
macroeconomic results achieved by Italy are as fragile as the ones of the two 
other member states. If the ‘transition benchmark’ is a well-functioning political 
system, then we should be told what this means and where we see it at work.

Our impression is that we need more positive political science (rather than 
‘equilibrium’ analysis) to grasp the essence of the transformation of the Italian 
political system. We champion a non-teleological approach focused on the 
corroboration of theoretically guided expectations about meso-level political 
processes. Italy has never scored well in terms of ‘general political equilibrium’ 
axioms. It has never been close to the properties of ideal-typical pluralist 
democratic theory. Yet it has learned how to make profit from ‘disequilibria’ 
such as fragile governments, clientelism, family-based capitalism, and other 
peculiarities of the Italian model of capitalism. This invites a detailed examina-
tion of the changes in the Italian model of capitalism (see Della Sala, this 
issue) rather than normative statements on whether Italy has reached the final 
equilibrium or not.

Add the fact that the discussion on the incomplete transition chimes with 
the obsession of many Italian leaders about Italy not being a ‘normal country’. 
Like Japan, Italy has always been worried by the ‘great chase’ of the world’s 
leaders, agonizing over the issue of what it takes to become un paese normale, 
as Richard Samuels reminds us at the beginning of his Machiavelli’s Children 
(Samuels 2003: 12).

In this project we accept that Italy may well struggle with its own 
disequilibria for a long time and perhaps never become a paese normale, 
whatever that means. The question is how to analyse the impact of Europe 
without prejudging the results of Europeanization and without getting trapped 
in the normative discussion about the ‘final outcomes’. Our specific research 
questions are as follows:

- **Europeanization and political parties.** What is the role played by European 
  integration in the Italian political parties? How have salience (of Europe) 
  and party positions changed over the last fifteen years or so?
- **Political élites and the EU.** How have the Italian Members of the European 
  Parliament (MEPs) responded to Europeanization and domestic political 
  change? How far is their response explained by domestic politics or European-
  level variables?
• **Europeanization and local government.** How do local authorities react to the EU funding opportunities? How far do they change their organizational structures, their procedures and ‘ways of doing things’? Do these changes last once funding ceases?

• **The dynamics of pressure politics.** How have interested groups responded to Europeanization? Given that interest-group politics in the EU is multi-level, what does the comparison between the national and the regional level show?

• **The resiliency of the Italian model of capitalism.** Are the changes under way in the Italian model of capitalism a manifestation of adaptation or transformation? To what extent has Europeanization changed the Italian model of capitalism? What is the weight of Europeanization as opposed to other political dynamics affecting the dynamics of Italian economic governance?

• **Europeanization and policy paradigms.** Turning to the Italian policy towards the South – arguably, a case of paradigm change – has Europeanization caused or reinforced the emergence of new policy paradigms?

• **The welfare state under pressure: domestic politics or Europeanization?** How do Europeanization and domestic politics explain the changes under way in the Italian welfare state? What does the evidence of pension reforms tell us?

• **EMU as master drive of policy change.** Is EMU a vehicle of ideational change? How have European ideas affected domestic politics and policy? If ideas matter, what types of ideas were instrumental in bringing about economic policy change? Who is empowered by ideational change?

**APPROACH AND METHOD**

In order to answer these questions, we approach the analysis of Italian politics and policy with the aid of theories and models developed by mainstream comparative politics and theoretical policy analysis. In this project, we are not interested in Italian politics *per se*, but in the questions and puzzles that the Italian political system poses to theories, models, and hypotheses developed by mainstream political science.

Secondly, we approach the analysis of Europeanization with an original perspective. The analysis of the domestic impact of Europe often makes two assumptions. One is that the research design should start from Brussels and then track down the implications for domestic politics and policy of what was agreed at the EU table. The other is that the EU level is characterized by a high level of coherence and ‘order’ (as opposed to ambiguity and chaos). By doing so, Europeanization studies can make all sort of claims about the adaptational pressure created by the ‘order’ created in Brussels on the member states, and claims about the ‘distance’ between EU governance and domestic structures and styles of governance (as articulated in the debate about the ‘goodness of fit’, see Börzel and Risse 2003). The former assumption tends to prejudge the role of the EU in domestic politics and policy change. It also makes it impossible to distinguish between domestic change as the result of
EU impacts and change originated either by globalization or by domestic problems (such as demographic change in pension reforms or party competition in party politics). The latter is inconsistent with the high level of ambiguity in EU governance, and the active role of domestic players in decoding, editing, and creatively transforming EU governance, thus making use of Europe rather than simply reacting to it (Jacquot and Woll 2003).

Thirdly, we use a bottom-up research design to tackle Europeanization (see Radaelli 2003 for details). The meaning of bottom-up may be confusing. To clarify: we do not necessarily look at Europeanization as a process ‘coming from below’; that is, a process triggered by social learning and transformations originating at the local level and then transferred to EU institutions and politics. We do not wish to predetermine whether the EU is changing from below or from above. In our view, bottom-up refers to research designs. Specifically, we use the term ‘bottom-up Europeanization’ to indicate a research design that is pitched at the level of domestic politics and policy (national or local). We start from the analysis of the system of interaction (actors, resources, problems, style, and collective problem-solving rules) at the domestic level and we raise the question whether the EU affects this system of interaction and if so in what way (as a resource, as a reformulation of the problem, as a new set of collective problem-solving rules, as a constraint on what is feasible, as an alteration to the opportunity structure, as a new frame of reference, etc.). This way we do not prejudge the role of Europeanization. We focus on measuring policy and political change at the domestic level and we address the question: what is the role of the EU in domestic change? The aim is to integrate domestic and European variables, not to separate them artificially.

THE RESULTS
In this issue, Kritzinger, Cavatorta and Chari analyse the positioning of Italian parties with regard to the EU and the saliency of European-related issues, through a content analysis of 1979–99 national and European election manifests. They show that, although there is no sign of a rise in pre-eminence of EU-related issues in electoral campaigning, the stance of leading Italian political parties with regard to the EU has changed over time, showing greater dynamism in the 1990s than in the previous decade and a half. More significant changes can be detected in middle-size parties, with the right-wing Alleanza Nazionale becoming more pro-European and the Northern League increasingly Euro-sceptic. Europe is a dimension on which Italian parties are competing.

And yet, Kreppel shows that the dramatic upheaval of the Italian party system in the 1990s does not seem to have had long-term radical consequences on the way Italian MEPs have expressed their votes in relation to other MEPs and on the distribution of key European Parliament (EP) positions (e.g. rapporteurships and committee chairmanships). These results can be interpreted as the result of either ‘stickiness’ of the EP internal workings or institutionalization (‘Europeanization’) of the Italian new political élite. Kreppel
presents evidence suggesting that both the Partito Democratico di Sinistra (PDS, now “Democratici di Sinistra”) and Forza Italia MEPs changed their behaviour in order to work within the EP. In other words, they were inculcated into the norms and controlled by the rules of the EP.

Down to the lowest level of political authority, Zerbinati analyses, from a comparative perspective, the procedural, administrative and policy-paradigmatic changes undertaken by five British and Italian local authorities in their attempt to secure EU funding. These cover resource assessment, project development and management, policy learning and know-how transfer. With two exceptions, she shows a non-trivial degree of adaptation and transformation across the board, with greater magnitude (and success) in the British than the Italian cases and question marks as to their persistence over time.

Moving on to other socio-political actors, Constantelos examines whether and how EU-related issues have shaped objectives, strategies and organizational decisions of national and regional business associations in Italy, especially in light of EMU. Constantelos provides evidence of procedural and organizational reform that is tied directly to EU developments. Moreover, he reveals a heightened attentiveness to European issues by both the Confindustria and regional associations. Whether this has led to deeper changes in lobbying targets, channels and strategies is, however, more open to question.

On the other hand, Della Sala reviews changes in Italian capitalism, especially with regard to finance, corporate governance, industrial relations and labour market regulation, and illustrates how their overall trend is towards the adoption of characteristic features of liberal market economies (e.g. greater role of equity markets, more flexible labour markets). Della Sala cautions, however, against any conclusion suggesting deep-rooted changes in the structure of Italian capitalism. He sees the role of European-related factors being at best indirect and covarying with broader global trends.

The last three contributions to this issue deal with the ever important topic of policy change. Bull and Baudner illustrate how Europeanization mechanisms have operated in the reform of the regional policy in Southern Italy. They revealed institutional deficiencies of Southern regions, via the unsuccessful use of the structural funds, which helped to shape the new policy paradigm by facilitating the removal of some policy options and legitimizing others. Yet, domestic coalitions and factors were centre stage. Unlike most of the literature on Europeanization which insists on the importance of EU pressure (Cowles et al. 2001: 2; Börzel and Risse 2003: 61), Bull and Baudner show that ‘pressure’ is less important than the domestic usage of Europe. The impact of European policies depends on the willingness and capability of domestic actors to exploit ‘Europe’. Domestic actors make use of EU policy paradigms as focal points around which a new paradigm is built. As such, Europeanization is an intervening variable, although a decisive one. And the whole concept of Europeanization is disfranchised from the normative idea of ‘policy success’ and the association with ‘final points of arrival’, to become part of a process
of evolution where policy-makers move on to new policy paradigms but still preserve elements of the old ones.

Natali carries out a similar exercise with regard to pension reform in the 1990s, paying particular attention to the circumstances that instigate the opening of a window for policy change. Domestic factors, such as the looming financial and legitimacy crisis and the consequent shift in public opinion, were undoubtedly predominant. However, Natali highlights how the exit from the European monetary system (EMS) and the constraints set out in the Maastricht Treaty were focusing events that precipitated the reform even further. This is yet another case in which EU-level variables become less important when assessed in a bottom-up research design. Domestic policy entrepreneurs have played the crucial role in making use of Europe to widen their windows of opportunity for reform.

Finally, Quaglia looks at EMU as ideational construct. Moving beyond the debate on whether ideas matter in politics, she addresses the question of which ideas matter and why. Specifically, she contrasts foreign policy ideas with economic policy ideas, and finds that the former are crucial in two of her three cases (the creation of the EMS in 1978–79 and the joining of EMU in 1999). There are two implications. Firstly, the beliefs about the proper place of Italy in the international system are more endogenous than the policy paradigm of credibility and central bank independence, clearly ‘imported’ from Europe (although US-educated Italian technocrats were active agents of policy transfer). Hence endogenous ideas may have been more important than exogenous ones. Secondly, since ideas are transmitted into policy decisions by actors, one can submit that foreign policy ideas are championed by political leaders, and economic ideas by central bankers or experts working in the core executive, think-tanks or academia. Quaglia’s findings lead to the conclusion that the differential power of foreign and economic policy ideas reflects the still dominant position of political elites in Europeanization processes.

CONCLUSION

After more than forty years of inertia or, at best, piecemeal change, the Italian political system has been transformed. The challenge facing scholars of Italian and European politics has been to disentangle the relative importance of global, European and domestic factors that impacted on such transformation. The works in this special issue use the tools provided by comparative politics subfields (e.g. electoral competition, voting behaviour, public administration, lobbying, political economy) and policy analysis to engage this enterprise. Results suggest that any generalization on the Europeanization of the Italian political system is unwarranted, though we do feel that this meso-level non-teleological approach allows us to exert good leverage in the analysis of political change in Italy.

Europeanization is seldom an independent variable when measured in bottom-up research designs that do not prejudge the role of EU-level variables. However,
it often acts as an intervening variable, and the impact on domestic politics and policy hinges on how domestic political actors make use of Europe. Consequently, our findings invite a reconsideration of the mechanisms of Europeanization, from ‘pressure’ to ‘domestic usages of Europe’. ‘Pressure’ may be discursively created or broadened by domestic coalitions and entrepreneurs, rather than being an objective distance between EU-level templates and domestic structures.

Europeanization should also not be seen in teleological terms, both in the sense of a final point of arrival and as a benchmark for policy success and completion of the Italian transition. It is a context in which domestic political action is increasingly intertwined. As context, it can be contested (Kritzinger et al.), edited or absorbed by political actors and domestic institutions (Kreppel, Zerbinati, Constantelos), used as ideational focal point by pro-reform coalitions (Bull and Baudner, Quaglia and, to some extent, Della Sala), or exploited by policy entrepreneurs (Natali). Paradoxically, perhaps, the power of Europe appears more evident when we abandon unrealistic notions of Europeanization and situate Europe in the logic of domestic political action.

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NOTES

1 In 1985, 58 per cent of Italians thought that the government should control prices and profits in the car industry (56 per cent in the case of the banking and
insurance industry) and 12.6 per cent were in favour of nationalization (20.6 per cent in the case of banking and industry). 87.5 per cent thought that the government should provide a job to whoever wanted one, 96.6 per cent that the government should control the price system, and 73.6 per cent were in favour of state aid to ailing industries (Weber et al. 1989: 62–5).

2 However, the important Title V of the Italian Constitution was changed to steer the process of devolution under way in Italy.

3 This may not be peculiar to Italy. Portugal, Spain, and Greece have often considered themselves the ‘problem’ (in terms of democratization, modernization, efficient economic governance, structural reforms, and so on) and Europe the ‘solution’. ‘España es el problema, Europa la solución’, said Ortega y Gasset at a conference at the association El Sitio in Bilbao, almost a hundred years ago (1910). We are grateful to Fabio Garcia for having drawn our attention to this quote.


5 However, the literature on the goodness of fit is not unaware of the role played by domestic actors. The capability of domestic actors to exploit the new opportunities and constraints created by pressure is a sufficient condition for change in Börzel and Risse’s approach to Europeanization (Börzel and Risse 2003: 64).


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